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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
SHANE HOCHSTETTER, : Case No. 890537-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Title 77, Part 35f 
Section 26 of the Utah Code (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 2a Section 
3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgement of conviction 
for the offenses of Aggravated Robbery and Falsely Signing a 
Financial Transaction Card Sales Slip entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Was appellant denied his right to effective of 
assistance of counsel by trial counsel's failure to request or 
submit a cautionary instructon on eyewitness identification? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the of nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Shane Hochstetter, was charged in a two 
count information with the offenses of Aggravated Robbery, a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) and 
Falsely Signing a Financial Transaction Card Sales Slip a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-506.1 (1953 as amended). 
(R. 6) Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial. (R. 
27, 28) He was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years to 
life and one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 
63,64). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, Ola Brattegard testified that in the early 
morning hours of May 21, 1988, he and a friend, Marie Sorieno, 
were taking a walk on First Avenue in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 51) 
The couple was stopped by three males whom he had never seen 
before. In court, Brattegard identified one of the males as the 
appellant. (Tr. 53) Brattegard testified that appellant 
brandished a handgun and threatened to kill him unless he gave 
them all his money. (Tr. 53, 55) The witness originally 
believed that a knife had been brandished, but then realized that 
it was a small caliber handgun. (Tr. 55) Brattegard gave the 
robbers his coat and the three ran away. (Tr. 56) The coat 
contained Brattegard's wallet, money, telephone credit card and 
bank credit card. A Loris watch and an identification card for 
Brattegard from the Norwegian army were also in the coat. (Tr. 
57) 
The witness described the gunman as about six feet two 
inches tall with thin long hair. He stated that the gunman was 
wearing a black leather jacket and a yellow bandanna. (Tr. 61) 
Brattegard had previously described the gunman as being five feet 
nine inches tall, one hundred fifty pounds and having medium 
length hair. (Tr. 122, 125) The robbery took place at two 
o'clock in the morning on a street that had no street lights. 
(Tr. 51, 61-62) 
Annette Scott testified that she worked at a gift shop 
at Fashion Place Mall in Murray, Utah. (Tr. 68) She identified 
a credit card transaction slip made out to Ola Brattegard for the 
purchase of a bracelet on the morning of May 21, 1988. (Tr. 69) 
Brattegard has previously testified that it was not his signature 
on that transaction slip. (Tr. 58) The address written on the 
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slip was "180 P St" in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 69) Ms. Scott was 
not able to give a description of the person who purchased the 
bracelet and stated that she was not positive if she had ever 
seen appellant other than in court. (Tr. 74) 
Mike John Casner identified a pawn card from Main 
Street Pawn. (Tr. 77) Mr. Casner did not specifically remember 
the transaction. He stated that he is required to get a picture 
identification and take a thumb print on the card. (Tr. 77) The 
card identified by Mr. Casner contained appellant's name and 
reflected that a California identification was used. (Tr. 81) 
The card further reflected that a gold bracelet and Loris watch 
had been pawned on the afternoon of May 21, 1988. (Tr. 75, 78) 
Fifteen year old Misty Mortenson testified that she had 
met appellant through some friends. (Tr. 82) She indicated that 
in May of 1988 the appellant, Jay Cane and others were at her 
residence on 180 P Street in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 82, 84, 90) 
She stated that at that time Jay Kane and appellant talked about 
robbing a Norwegian army sergeant. (Tr. 85, 93) Heather Smith 
testified that she was with the appellant and others at the 
Speedway Cafe in Ogden, Utah. (Tr. 96) They were there to 
listen to a band called the "Pagan Babies." (Tr. 98) She stated 
that during the evening appellant and others talked about having 
robbed a Norwegian army sergeant. (Tr. 96) A wrist watch that 
was supposed to have been taken in the robbery was passed around. 
(Tr. 98) Ms. Smith initially indicated this occured in June, 
1988. (Tr. 96) She later stated that she could not recall if 
the conversation occured before or after May 21, 1988. (Tr. 99) 
Ms. Smith also testified that a friend named David has called her 
on a stolen telephone credit card. (Tr. 97) 
A crime laboratory technician, Steven Rowley, testified 
that appellant's thumbprint was on the pawn shop card. (Tr. 107) 
He also testified that the same person who filled out appellant's 
application for a California driver's license wrote the phrase 
"180 P" on the credit card slip from the gift shop at Fashion 
Place Mall. (Tr. Ill) He testified that the two documents had 
thirteen common letters. (Tr. 114) Sargeant Rowley stated "I 
determined that approximately 10 to 12 of those [letters] were 
written almost the same." (Tr. 114) 
Appellant testified in his own behalf. He denied 
participating in the robbery. (Tr. 133) He did admit that he 
had pawned a bracelet and a watch. (Tr. 134) Appellant 
testified that the items were pawned to buy gas. He received the 
bracelet from an individual named Jay Kane and the watch from an 
individual named Eric. (Tr. 134) Appellant testified that he 
was with Heather Smith at a "Pagan Babies" performance on May 17, 
1988. (Tr. 132) Appellant denied that he had written "180 P" on 
the credit card slip. (Tr. 137) He also testified that his 
mother had done most of the writing on his driver's license 
application. (Tr. 145) Appellant further denied that he had 
made statements about the robbery to either Heather Smith or 
Misty Mortenson. (Tr. 143-144) Appellant testified that he was 
present when Jay Kane and two other males named Eric and Brook 
talked to Misty Mortenson about robbing a Norwegian army 
sergeant. (Tr. 131) 
Trial counsel for appellant did not submit any jury 
instructions. The trial court asked counsel, sua sponte, if he 
desired an eyewitness identification instruction, (Tr. 154) 
Counsel responded, "I have no objection to going without it." 
The court then asked
 f
 nYou do not want one?" and counsel 
responded "No.11 (Tr. 155) With respect to the robbery count, 
trial counsel raised an identification defense. In his opening 
statement, he discussed discrepancies between the appellant's 
physical appearance and Brattegard's initial description of the 
gunman. (Tr. 188-119) In closing, counsel also argued the 
problems with the eyewitness identification. (Tr. 169-170) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The failure to submit a cautionary instruction on 
eyewitness identification constituted deficient performance by 
trial counsel which was not an exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment. There was no conceivable tactical 
advantage in refusing to request the instruction. Further, the 
failure to request the instruction was prejudicial to appellant's 
case because there was a reasonable probability that the result 
would have been different had that instruction been given. 
The instruction that the trial court referred to was not made 
part of the record. However, it is fairly obvious that the court 
was inquiring about the preferred instruction described in State 




APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE A CAUTIONARY 
JURY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
WAS NOT SUBMITTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
as applied to the States guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S 668 (1984), the Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment also entitled criminal defendants to 
effective assistance of counsel. In that case, the Court 
established a two prong test to determine if a defendant has been 
denied that right. First, there must be a showing that counsel's 
performance was deficient. Second, there must be a showing of 
prejudice. The deficiency in performance cannot be presumed from 
counsel's inexperience, a lack of time to prepare, or the 
complexity of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648 (1984). Under the ruling in Strickland, prejudice is shown 
if the result of the trial probably would have been different. 
This must be based on a review of all the evidence. The Court 
noted that the ultimate focus must be on the fundamental fairness 
of the proceeding. 
All of the recent decisions addressing the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel from this court and the Supreme 
Court of Utah have applied the Strickland test. With respect to 
the requirement of the showing of a deficient performance, 
specific acts or ommissions must be alleged. There must be a 
showing that such acts were not the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Ut. 1986). 
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If a lawyer exercises judgement in his choice of trial strategy 
or tactics that does not produce a favorable result there is not 
necessarily ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Colonna, 
766 P.2d 1062 (Ut. 1988). In Colonna, the court indicated that 
deference will be given to counsel's trial decisions. The court 
went on to state, "Generally, an attorney's performance will be 
held ineffective only when there is no tactical or strategic 
justification for his conduct at the trial" 766 P.2d at 1066. 
In State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989) 
this court discussed the function of an appellate court in 
addressing the prejudice requirement of the Strickland standard. 
The court stated: 
We must...determine if counsel's deficient 
performance undermines our confidence in the 
verdict against the defendant. [citation 
ommitted] Specifically, we must decide if a 
reasonable probability exists that the jury's 
verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant... 
771 P.2d at 692. The reviewing court may first assess the issue 
of prejudice in disposing of ineffective counsel claims. 
Strickland v. Washington, supra: Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 
(Ut. 1988) 
In this case the specific act constituting ineffective 
assistance of counsel relates to the failure to have the jury 
given a cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification. 
Before an ineffective counsel claim may succeed on a jury 
instruction issue, the appellant must show that he was entitled 
to the instruction. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Ut. 1988). In 
State v. Long, supra, the court found prejudicial error in the 
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refusal to give a cautionary instruction on the issue of 
eyewitnesses identification. In that case the court discussed in 
detail the serious problems with eyewitnesses identification 
evidence. The court rejected a corroboration requirement as a 
solution to the problems with eyewitness identification. The 
court then stated: 
...we do consider ourselves compelled by the 
overwhelming weight of the empirical research 
to take steps to alleviate the difficulties 
inherent in any use of eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
We are convinced that, at a minimum, 
additional judicial guidance to the jury in 
evaluating such testimony is warranted. We 
therefore today abandon our discretionary 
approach to cautionary jury instructions and 
direct that in cases tried from this date 
forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case 
and such an instruction is requested by the 
defense. Given the great weight jurors are 
likely to give eyewitness testimony, and the 
deep and generally unperceived flaws in it, 
to convict a defendant on such evidence 
without advising the jury of the factors that 
should be considered in evaluating it could 
well deny the defendant due process of law 
under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
721 P.2d at 490. If properly requested, the trial court in this 
case would have been required to give this cautionary 
instruction. In fact, the trial court suggested to counsel that 
such an instruction be given. (Tr. 154) 
With respect to the first prong of the Strickland test, 
trial counsel's rejection of the eyewitness instruction clearly 
constituted a deficient performance that fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. In this regard, 
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this case is very similar to the situation in State v. Moritzsky, 
supra. In Moritzsky, the defendant had been convicted of 
aggravated assault. He had claimed defense of habitation. The 
evidence was in conflict. However, the defendant's testimony 
indicated that the victim had come into his residence before 
defendant shot at him. The jury instruction submitted by defense 
counsel failed to incorporate a presumption that the defendant 
acted reasonably if the victim's entry was made under 
circumstances specified in Utah Code Annotated §76-2-405(2) (1953 
as amended). The court in Moritzsky found that the defendant 
would have been entitled to have the jury instructed on the 
presumption if it had been properly requested. The court held 
that there was no conceivable tactical basis for requesting a 
defense of habitation instruction without the presumption. The 
conviction in Moritzsky was reversed and a new trial ordered. 
In the instant case, the defense to the aggravated 
robbery charge was that Ola Brattegard was mistaken in his 
identification of appellant. The suggested instruction from 
o 
State v. Long, supra, details the various factors that may 
affect an eyewitness identification. Several of those factors 
were present here: the lighting, the time of day, the stress of 
the situation, prior identifications, the circumstances 
surrounding the identification and discrepancies in the 
description of appellant and the robber. The purpose of this 
instruction is to alleviate the problems inherent in eyewitness 
2 
The instruction is reproduced in its entirety in the 
Addendum. 
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identification evidence. Consequently, there can be no 
conceivable tactical advantage in not requesting such an 
instruction. 
The final issue to be addressed is that of prejudice. 
If this case was based soley on eyewitness identification 
evidence, there would be no question as to the prejudice in 
failing to give the cautionary instruction. State v. Long, 
supra. In addition to the eyewitness identification evidence 
there was evidence that the appellant made statements about the 
robbery. The state also introduced opinion evidence on the 
handwriting analysis of the credit card slip and the documents 
from the pawn shop. However, appellant did testify and deny 
that he had committed the robbery. He also testified that he did 
not make the statements, nor did he use the victim's credit card 
on the day following the robbery. Thus the credibility of this 
additional evidence was put at issue. 
There were serious problems with the credibility of 
Misty Mortenson and Heather Smith. Misty Mortenson testified 
that both appellant and Jay Kane were talking about the robbery. 
She was unable to describe who said what in the conversation. 
(Tr. 92) Appellant testified that he was present when the 
conversation took place, but it was Jay Kane and two others who 
discussed committing the robbery. (Tr. 1331) Heather Smith 
described talking to appellant about the robbery at a "Pagan 
Babies" performance. (Tr. 98) She also testified that she and 
others saw the watch taken from the Norwegian sergeant at the 
time of the robbery. (Tr. 97) She did not know if that 
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conversation took place before or after May 21f 1988. Appellant 
testified that he attended the "Pagan Babies" performance on May 
17, 1988. (Tr. 132) Smith's testimony was inconsistent with the 
documentary evidence from the pawn shop indicating that the watch 
was pawned at 2:30 p.m. on the day following the robbery. (Tr. 
76) Finally, appellant testified that the two women were willing 
to implicate him in the robbery to protect their boyfriends. 
(Tr. 144) 
With respect to the handwriting evidence, Steven Rowley 
testified that he compared the writing on the credit card slip 
and the writing on appellant's driver's license application. His 
opinion was that the person who wrote "180 P" on the credit card 
slip also filled out the driver's license application. (Tr. 111-
112) This was based on ten to twelve letters that were written 
almost the same. (Tr. 114) Appellant testified that he did not 
fill out the credit card slip, nor did he fill out the majority 
of the driver's license application. (Tr. 135-136) 
Interestingly, there was no comparison of the handwriting on the 
credit card slip and the pawn slip. Appellant admitted pawning 
the watch and bracelet. (Tr. 134) Appellant testified that he 
received the watch from Jay Kane and the gold bracelet from an 
individual named Eric. (Tr. 134) Eric was one of the people who 
was present at Misty Mortenson's residence when the robbery was 
discussed. (Tr. 131) 
As can be seen, serious issues relating to the 
credibility of the evidence had to be decided by the jury. 
Because of these credibility problems the evidence other than the 
eyewitness identification was of questionable reliability. Thus, 
the eyewitness evidence would be left to stand on its own. 
Consequently, there is a reasonable probability that the result 
of the trial would have been different had the requested 
instruction on eyewitness identification been given. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial counsel's failure to allow the court to give a 
cautionary instruction to the jury on eyewitness identification 
constituted a deficient performance. The failure to give that 
instruction was prejudicial to appellant's case. Appellant's 
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the 
district court for a new trial. 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of December, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
MAILED/DELIVERED to the Utah State Attorney General's office, at 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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ADDENDUM 
The proposed jury instruction from State v. Long, 
supra: 
One of the most important questions [The only important question] 
in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person 
who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was 
committed but also that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime. Ifr after considering the evidience you 
have heard from both sides, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed 
the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was insincere, but merely that [the 
witness] was mistaken in his [her] belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed 
the crime, you should consider the following: 
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the 
criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible and 
undistinguished; 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting noises or activity 
during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witnesses' opportunity 
to observe the person committing the crime; 
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the 
witness' capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol; 
[You should also consider whether the witness is of a different 
race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person of a 
different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race.] 
3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal 
actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the 
witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time he 
[she] observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate 
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he [she] 
may not have done so unless he [she] was aware that a crime was 
being committed. 
4) Was the witness' identification of the defendant completely 
the product of his [her] own memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the witness' original 
observation and his [her] identification of the defendant; 
b) the witnesss' [mental] capacity and state of mind and the 
time of the identifications; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or 
identifications given by other witness, to photographs or 
newspaper accounts, or to any other information or influence that 
may have affected the independence of his [her] identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the 
crime, failed to identify the defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the 
crime, gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with 
the defendant's appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to 
the witness for identification. 
[You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented to the witness.] 
[You may also take in to account that identifications made from 
seeing the person are generally more reliable that 
identifications made from a photograph.] 
Again I emphasize that the burden of proving that the defendant 
is the person who committed the crime is on the prosecution. If, 
after considering the evidence you have heard from the 
prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluting the 
eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty. 
771 P.2d at 494-495 fn. 8. 
